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Governments in low-income countries (LICs) have the difficult task of
making wide-ranging decisions about public spending, taxation, and bor-
rowing.Although we can analyze at length how both public spending and
taxation can be designed and implemented to contribute to growth and
poverty reduction, the biggest challenge that most developing countries
face is in determining how much they can borrow without jeopardizing
their long-term prospects. The objective of this chapter is to introduce
the key issues involved in debt sustainability analysis (DSA). We will re-
view the main approaches developed in the literature, starting from the
traditional fiscal and external approaches and covering recent alternative
frameworks, such as the debt overhang analysis and the human develop-
ment approach (especially as it relates to the funding requirements for
achieving the Millennium Development Goals [MDGs]).
Debt sustainability requires that indebtedness be kept in line with the
capacity of the borrower to repay (IMF 2003). At a firm or project level,
this means that borrowed funds should be invested productively with a
return high enough to cover debt-service costs. This simple definition,
however, is not as easily applied to countries as it is to firms or projects.
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Government borrowing often is used to cover public deficits rather than
to invest in specific projects, and the returns to public investments in the
social sectors or infrastructure may materialize only in the distant future.
This makes it difficult to take the returns to investment into account. In
addition, debt-servicing capacity is determined by government revenues,
which depend on tax rates as well as on economic growth. Finally, debt
sustainability is affected by variables that often are not under government
control, such as the level of world interest rates, the degree of concession-
ality in the loans received, and the foreign exchange rate.
Given the complex web of factors that affect debt sustainability and
are affected by it, the concept cannot be captured in a single indicator or
in simple rules of thumb that would apply indiscriminately to all coun-
tries. What is needed when working on debt sustainability is a country-
specific analysis looking at a set of different indicators and their dynam-
ics, with a particular focus on identifying binding constraints to
development as well as key vulnerabilities to which the country may be
exposed in the future. At the same time, some guidance and an overview
of the main approaches used in the literature on debt sustainability
should be useful to anyone studying the relationships between public fi-
nance and poverty reduction.
The traditional approaches to debt sustainability cover two basic crite-
ria: fiscal and external. Consider first fiscal sustainability. Developing
countries typically experience a chronic shortfall of domestic savings over
the (targeted) level of domestic investment required to generate enough
growth to reduce poverty and to meet the MDGs. This savings gap often
is mirrored by a fiscal gap—that is, the public sector runs a fiscal deficit
to allow for more spending than would be allowed on the basis of gov-
ernment revenue (or more investment than would be allowed on the ba-
sis of public saving).1 To the extent that it is not covered by monetary fi-
nancing, the deficit feeds into increased debt, either foreign or domestic.
In some countries, it is necessary to consider the possibility of a recur-
rent-fiscal gap. For instance, if there is limited tax capacity, it is not possi-
ble to make some crucial recurrent spending that would provide the min-
imum quality of public services in such areas as law and order, road
maintenance, basic health care, or education services. Such expenditures
may have an important bearing on the profitability of public investments
as well as on private investment. A second possibility for the occurrence
of a recurrent-fiscal gap is when there is some unused capital expenditure
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budget that, for some reason, cannot be transferred into the current budg-
et. This may happen in some aid-dependent developing countries where
there is not enough country budget ownership and donors funding in-
vestment projects face absorption capacity limits on the recipient side but
are reluctant to divert some of those resources to the current budget.
Beyond a fiscal gap, many countries are confronted with an external fi-
nancing gap, which may lead to concerns about the external sustainabili-
ty of the country’s debt. LICs must rely on foreign capital to finance their
savings gap. In an open economy, the excess of domestic investment over
domestic savings is equal to the trade deficit; or, put in other terms, an ex-
cess of domestic investment over national savings translates into a current
account deficit. Because LICs’ debts are largely denominated in foreign
currencies, productive investments should enable countries to convert
domestic resources into foreign exchange by generating sufficient export
earnings—but this is not always the case.
In addition to the concerns about fiscal and external debt sustainabili-
ty, the recent literature has identified two additional constraints that feed
into debt sustainability concepts and indicators. These relatively recent
phenomena, partly linked to the current debt burden itself, have been
translated into “alternative” concepts of debt sustainability, two of which
are especially important here. First, a high current debt itself may severe-
ly hamper future debt-servicing capacity because it might introduce to
the economy all kinds of disincentive effects to invest and adjust, result-
ing in a severe negative effect on future economic growth. This is the so-
called debt overhang hypothesis. This effect is usually linked to a high stock
of debt. Second, a high current debt-service burden also may act as an im-
portant constraint that is difficult to deal with from a political or moral
point of view.The issue is that the resources allocated to debt service may
crowd out social or other poverty-related spending as defined, for in-
stance, through the measures needed to reach the MDGs or other targets
specified in a country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). As
such, a wedge can be inserted between the capacity to pay debt service
and what would be considered “affordable” debt service (EURODAD
2001) in order not to crowd out priority sector spending. The so-called
human development approach to debt sustainability refers specifically to
the spending necessary to reach social and poverty reduction goals, and
the political pressure to take on more debt to finance needed additional
expenditures.
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Given the multiple dimensions of the debt sustainability issue, instead
of using a one-dimensional measure of debt sustainability, we would ar-
gue that it is preferable to rely on a framework that recognizes the multi-
ple constraints faced by LICs. This argument implies that DSA should be
carried out using a menu of indicators, including both the present value
of the debt stock and debt-service indicators relative to a range of vari-
ables, such as exports, revenues, and GDP; and analyzing their dynamic
evolution over time using realistic macroeconomic assumptions. It also is
important to simulate the effect of country-specific key bottlenecks and
vulnerabilities. To apply such a menu of indicators and approaches suc-
cessfully in a country-specific context, one has to show which aspects are
most binding in a particular case and moment in time.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next section, we provide a
brief review of the theoretical concepts used in traditional debt analysis
to derive a list of possible constraints and variables that affect debt sus-
tainability. In the third section, we discuss how different indicators have
been applied in operational schemes, such as the Enhanced Heavily In-
debted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the new (revised) Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank (2006) framework for long-
term debt sustainability for LICs. The fourth section is devoted to an
analysis of alternative DSA frameworks (such as the debt overhang hy-
pothesis and the human development approach to debt sustainability).
There is also a brief discussion of the new debt relief initiative advocated
by the Group of Eight (G-8)—the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative
(MDRI)—that situates debt relief within an MDG perspective. A conclu-
sion completes the chapter.
Traditional Approaches to Debt Sustainability: A Brief Review
LICs are confronted by multiple constraints when making policy deci-
sions that may affect their debt sustainability. First, there is a foreign ex-
change constraint, reflecting limits on the ability to transform domestic
factors of production into the foreign exchange required for external debt
service and the financing of imports. There is a fiscal constraint, reflecting
the government’s limited ability to tax in order to meet its debt-service
obligations, next to other expenditure priorities. And one could add a
constraint in terms of the fungibility of resources—for example, due to
earmarking of revenues for certain sectors, subnational governments, or
24 Public Finance for Poverty Reduction
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
public agencies; or due to restrictions on shifting resources from invest-
ment to recurrent expenditures. All these constraints may lead to a severe
shortage of funds available for recurrent expenditures and thus cause sit-
uations where debt service has to compete with other recurrent priority
spending. These constraints, and the need to borrow to invest for the
country’s development and provide much-needed basic services to the
population, also may give rise to the so-called twin-deficit situation—a
fiscal deficit coupled with a current account balance deficit.
Our objective in this section is to link the different potentially binding
constraints faced by LICs with simple concepts and indicators that are de-
veloped in the literature and applied in practice to measure debt sustain-
ability. We focus first on fiscal sustainability concepts, and then discuss
external sustainability indicators. We also briefly present the solvency ap-
proach to debt sustainability. Building on the concept of the present val-
ue of debt in the solvency approach, and given that most low-income
debt is concessional, we then show how the conventional fiscal and ex-
ternal sustainability concepts can be fine-tuned by using this present val-
ue of debt concept rather than nominal stocks or debt-service flows. We
start with the traditional approaches to debt sustainability, leaving the
other two alternative concepts for later.
Fiscal Approach
The conventional accounting approach to fiscal sustainability is based on
a simple indicator: the ratio of debt to gross domestic product (GDP).
The difficulty lies in estimating this ratio and in analyzing how it changes
over time. There are many good descriptions of the mathematics of debt
sustainability in the literature. One such description, which is both de-
tailed and short, is provided by Ley (2004). To present the concepts of
debt sustainability as simply as possible in our review, we will not derive
the key results of the literature; rather, we simply will provide and inter-
pret them. The reader is referred to Ley (2004) or other similar accounts
for a formal treatment.2
To estimate the ratio of debt to GDP at any point in time, one first
must estimate the level of debt. It is easiest to start with nominal debt (as
opposed to the present value of debt that we will define later). We first
note that, at any point in time, the government budget constraint states
that a (primary) fiscal deficit not financed by money creation will feed
automatically into higher public debt. Conversely, fiscal surpluses can be
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used to reduce the public debt stock. This means that the debt at time t is
equal to the debt at time t – 1 plus the interest paid on the debt minus
the creation of money and a term (the primary budget balance) equal to
the difference between the resources available to the government from
tax revenues and foreign aid in the form of grants, and the use of those re-
sources in the form of recurrent consumption and investments. Formally,
this equation can be written as follows:
Dt = Dt–1 + iDt–1 – (T + Agb – Ig – C*g ) – DM = (1 + i)Dt–1 – (B + DM), (2.1)
where D is the stock of public debt; i is the average nominal interest rate
on public debt; T is the domestic government revenue, consisting mainly
of taxes; Agb is foreign aid in the form of grants flowing to the government
budget; C*g is government recurrent spending (including transfers) but ex-
clusive of interest payment on public debt;DM is monetary financing; and
B is the primary (that is, noninterest) government balance, including bud-
getized grant aid (with B>0 denoting a surplus).
The concept of sustainability implies that we must look at changes in
debt indicators over time, and that we must normalize these indicators by
a measure of the government’s ability to service debt, such as government
revenue or GDP. Let’s denote by dt the ratio of debt to GDP at time t; by
rt the average real interest rate on the debt (after netting out inflation to
simplify the notation); by gt the real growth rate of GDP; and by b*t the
ratio of the primary balance, including any monetary financing, to GDP
at time t. With a few assumptions and relatively simple algebra applied to
equation (2.1), we can show that changes to the debt-to-GDP ratio over
time will adhere to the following “law of motion”:
Ddt =  rt – gt  dt–1 – b*t . (2.2)1 + gt
Equation (2.2) makes it clear that two key factors affect the ratio over
time. The first factor is the difference between the average real interest
rate on the debt (as denoted by r) and the real growth rate of GDP (de-
noted by g). The term (r – g)/(1 + g) usually is referred to in the literature
as the “endogenous dynamics” element of the relationship. The second
factor is the primary balance, including seigniorage or the creation or
printing of money by the government. Thus, if the average interest rate is
structurally higher than the GDP growth rate, the debt-to-GDP ratio will
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rise unless the government runs a sufficiently large primary fiscal surplus.
Keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio stable also will require a primary surplus.
If, on the other hand, the growth rate of GDP exceeds the average rate of
interest on public debt, keeping the debt-to-GDP ratio stable or even re-
ducing it is compatible with running a primary fiscal deficit.The intuition
for this result is that higher growth will generate higher revenues that will
make it easier to pay the government debt in the future. Note also that
equation (2.2) can be transformed into a relationship showing the pri-
mary balance (with monetary financing) b* that is required to stabilize
the public debt-to-GDP ratio (that is, Dd = 0). For countries that are able
to borrow at concessional interest rates, it is easier, in principle, to realize
a positive growth-to-interest rate differential. This in turn makes debt
sustainability easier to achieve and maintain even when running fiscal pri-
mary deficits. In reality, however, there have been many disappointing
cases of LICs with exploding debt ratios, despite favorable borrowing
terms, resulting from lower-than-expected growth rates (the implicit “re-
turn” on the borrowed funds), large deficits, or a combination of the two.
One could argue that sustainability should not be defined only in terms
of maintaining a stable debt-to-GDP ratio. Sustainability ultimately de-
pends on the difference between the current level of the debt ratio and
its “desired” level. Given a range of combinations of growth rates, interest
rates, and primary surpluses (for a given debt ratio), it is possible in prin-
ciple to arrive at and sustain a desired level of indebtedness. But the fiscal
sustainability framework presented here is intentionally not normative—
it only highlights the dynamic behavior of the indicator chosen to analyze
the sustainability of debt over time. More normative definitions of what
could constitute a desired, optimal, or sustainable level of debt will be in-
troduced in later sections of this chapter. Note also that, in principle, vul-
nerability to output shocks (which negatively influences the debt-to-
GDP ratio) could be dampened by making debt contingent—for example,
by creating instruments such as GDP-linked debt. In practice, however, it
appears to be extremely difficult to create a market for such instru-
ments.3
To this point we have treated the government budget identity and pub-
lic debt dynamics without considering whether financing was through
foreign or domestic debt. For most LICs, borrowing is primarily foreign,
which means that debt is contracted not in domestic but in foreign cur-
rency and, as such, it creates a structural mismatch problem on the gov-
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ernment’s balance sheet (that is, revenues in local currency and part of
the expenditures in foreign currency). Exchange rate dynamics thus play
an important role in determining the domestic cost of debt service and
fiscal sustainability.4
Define by et = Det/et–1 the change in the exchange rate over two peri-
ods (with a depreciation showing a positive sign), by a f the part of the
debt that is denominated in foreign-currency, by r* the weighted average
real interest rate on both foreign and domestic debt, and by rf the real in-
terest rate on the foreign debt. It can then be shown that
Ddt = r*t – gt + eta
f (1 + rt
f)dt–1 – b*t . (2.3)(1+ gt)
Equation (2.3) introduces a foreign exchange rate effect through the en-
dogenous dynamics term of the debt sustainability relationship, which
now is driven by four variables: (1) the interest rate on the debt, (2) the
growth rate of GDP, (3) the inflation rate (which does not appear in the
equation because we use real interest rates), and (4) the foreign exchange
rate.A depreciation of the currency will lead to an increase in the debt ra-
tio over time, and this increase will be larger if the share of the debt de-
nominated in foreign currency is larger and if the real interest rate paid
on the debt in foreign currency is higher.
Note also that changes in the exchange rate have a direct effect on the
domestic value of the foreign debt stock, and thus on the value of the
debt-to-GDP ratio—that is, on the value of dt–1 in equation (2.3). Because
the foreign exchange rate affects both the numerator and the denomina-
tor of the debt-to-GDP ratio, the overall effect depends on the degree of
matching in the economy between the composition of debt and the com-
position of output.The direct effect of exchange rate changes on the debt-
to-GDP ratio will be maximal when all public debt is foreign and the
economy produces no tradable output (or vice versa). In general, one
could argue that it is advisable, when feasible, to try moving the debt com-
position as close as possible to the composition of output in the economy.
One more extension developed by Ley (2004) is to decompose the
economy into the conventional tradable and nontradable sectors to show
the additional effect of exchange rate changes on price changes in the
tradable sector, which again affect the endogenous dynamics term. Ley
showed that the inflation rate in an open economy may be broken into
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two components, similar to the interest rate decomposition, to express it
as a weighted average of domestic and foreign inflation rates. The valua-
tion gains or losses in tradable sector output induced by the exchange rate
then depend on the share of tradable output in total output. Because this
introduces an exchange rate effect on the denominator of the endogenous
dynamics term in equation (2.3), it dampens the previous foreign ex-
change rate effect so that the result shown in equation (2.3) is best inter-
preted as the maximum foreign exchange effect.
One last remark on the accounting approach to DSA refers to the use
of specific variables for the denominator and numerator in the debt ratio.
We have presented the basic analysis of debt dynamics using the debt-to-
GDP ratio as a good indicator to measure debt sustainability. This should
be a rather obvious choice for fiscal sustainability, although other indica-
tors relating debt to government revenues can provide useful additional
information. Moreover, sustainability indicators where the numerator is a
flow variable rather than a stock variable, such as debt service to GDP or
to government revenues, also can provide complementary and sometimes
more useful information.
External Approach
We now turn to a discussion of the sustainability of the combined public
and private debt from a foreign exchange or external point of view. The
idea is to measure sustainability in terms of a foreign exchange constraint
instead of the fiscal constraint. A sustainable fiscal stance may not be suf-
ficient for external sustainability if private sector investment exceeds pri-
vate sector savings. Conversely, an unsustainable fiscal deficit may trans-
late into a sustainable external position if the balance of private savings
minus private investment is positive and compensates for an unsustain-
able fiscal deficit. Thus there may be divergence between fiscal and ex-
ternal sustainability (Parker and Kastner 1993).
For external debt analysis, all variables (including output) are now ex-
pressed in U.S. dollars rather than domestic currency, given the promi-
nence in U.S. dollar-denominated debt.5 Let us define Df as the total for-
eign debt stock, which is both public and private; i f´ as the average
nominal interest rate on total foreign debt; NICA* as the noninterest cur-
rent account, except for current transfers; Tr as the sum of official grants
and other current transfers; FI as the non-debt-creating (that is, equity)
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capital flows; and DNFA as the change in official reserves and other for-
eign assets (with a positive figure denoting an increase in foreign assets),
which also includes “exceptional finance.” The basic debt relationship
over time is given by the following equation:
Dt
f’ = (1 + it
f ’)Dt–1
f ’ – (NICA*t + Trt) – FIt + DNFAt. (2.4)
Equation (2.4), which is very similar to equation (2.1), provides the
starting point for the analysis. The only difference is that, instead of con-
sidering money financing for the fiscal approach, the relationship now is
based on the current account financing. The equivalent to equation (2.2)
for the fiscal approach is
Ddt
f’ =  rtf’ – gt’  dt–1f’ – nica**t . (2.5)1 + gt’
The key results are similar to those obtained for the fiscal accounting ap-
proach to debt sustainability. As before, the first key factor affecting the
ratio of debt to GDP is the difference between the real interest rate on
the debt and the real growth rate of GDP. These variables are expressed
in equation (2.5) with a tilt to highlight the fact that they are now ex-
pressed in dollar terms. For example, the growth rate is now the dollar-
denominated growth rate. The second factor is now the adjusted non-
interest current account balance. A noninterest current account not
financed by non-debt-creating equity flows or changes in the foreign re-
serves position feeds into higher external debt, whereas noninterest cur-
rent account surpluses can reduce the external debt stock. Thus, if the av-
erage interest rate is structurally higher than the GDP growth rate, the
debt-to-GDP ratio will rise unless the country runs a sufficiently large
noninterest current account surplus. On the other hand, if the growth
rate of GDP exceeds the average rate of interest on external debt, keep-
ing the debt-to-GDP ratio stable, or even reducing it, is compatible with
running a current account deficit.
As for the fiscal approach, exchange rate effects play a role in the dy-
namics of the external debt-to-GDP ratio to the extent that output is not
exclusively tradable sector output. For example, exchange rate deprecia-
tion directly increases the ratio of external debt to GDP as it decreases
the dollar value of GDP. Similar to the extensions alluded to in the dis-
cussion of the fiscal approach, changes in the exchange rate can be intro-
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duced more specifically in the analysis, and the exchange rate effect will
depend on the shares of tradable versus nontradable output. The effect
will be maximal when tradable output is zero.
Solvency Approach
The accounting approach to DSA enables one to estimate a sustainable
fiscal stance at a particular moment in time on the basis of a definition of
the fiscal deficit, which refers to the result of a fiscal year and its corre-
sponding annual borrowing requirements. However, governments do not
finance their expenses entirely with their annual income. Instead, they
shift spending between periods to meet annual fiscal targets. To analyze
the medium- and long-run sustainability of the fiscal policy, we must con-
sider the financing constraint facing the public sector in a long-term dy-
namic context. Looking at the government budget constraint from this
intertemporal viewpoint introduces the concept of long-term “solvency.”
Even if the government faces substantial fiscal deficits and a high (or pos-
sibly unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratio) today, the government still can be
considered solvent as long as resources generated in the future are suffi-
ciently large to cover all future debt-service obligations. The borrower
may experience a “liquidity” problem, but lenders should not worry too
much about current debt-servicing problems if they are prepared to roll
over current debt-servicing obligations. The same type of argument can
be made to some extent for the external approach to debt sustainability.
To take this argument into account, the solvency approach to fiscal
debt sustainability is based not on nominal debt, but on the present value
(PV) of future debt payments. The government can be considered solvent
as long as the present value of future resources available for debt servic-
ing (DS), as represented by future primary fiscal balances (adjusted for
seigniorage, B*), is larger than the present value of all future public debt-
servicing obligations (which equals the current public debt stock for bor-
rowers at market terms)—in other words, if the government has a posi-
tive net worth. The case of an equality between debt-service obligations
and future primary fiscal balances is referred to as the “no-Ponzi game”
condition.6
Because solvency is an intertemporal concept, these results imply that
there is no unique fiscal stance that ensures solvency. Higher expenses to-
day could be compensated by a cut in spending tomorrow, and govern-
ments have the flexibility to adopt different fiscal policy packages and
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choose the timing for doing so. This framework can be used to calculate
the required primary surplus necessary to stabilize the debt-to-output ra-
tio, which will depend on the difference between the (real) interest rate
and the (real) GDP growth rate. Again, inflation rates and exchange rate
(changes) can be introduced into the analysis.
Take PVD and PVB, respectively, to represent the present value (PV) of
future debt-service payments (DS) and of future primary fiscal balances
(including seigniorage, B*) by discounting these values of DS and B* at
the appropriate (real) discount rate, d. As such, public debt can be con-
sidered sustainable from a solvency point of view as long as








The net worth of a country is simply the difference between the two. The
upper bound for the time index of the present value calculation used in
determining the solvency constraint is important. Choosing an infinite
time horizon enables the country to stay solvent whenever it stabilizes
the debt-to-GDP ratio over time, without needing to pay back the debt
entirely. The analysis conducted in some of the existing solvency models
implies that solvency is ensured only when the rate of growth of the debt-
to-output ratio remains below the long-run value of the difference be-
tween the real output growth rate and the real interest rate. This implies
that the present discounted value of the government debt converges to
zero (Cuddington 1997), which is necessary only when working with a
solvency concept in a finite time horizon (T instead of ∞).
On a theoretical level, the solvency approach is the appropriate way to
look at fiscal sustainability. In practice, however, determining long-term
fiscal sustainability using the solvency constraint is difficult in part be-
cause estimating the present value of future revenue and expenditure
flows is problematic, particularly in LICs. Projecting real rates of growth
and real interest rates over the long run also can be very uncertain.7 For
this reason, only a few studies have tried to apply the solvency constraint
to developing countries (Buiter and Patel 1992; Haque and Montiel 1994;
Cuddington 1997). Most of the available models do not pretend to find a
long-run general equilibrium path, nor do they ensure consistency of the
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fiscal stance with balance of payments and growth targets. Therefore,
from an operational viewpoint, the solvency approach is less useful for
debt analysis than other, simpler approaches.
In a similar way to what has just been outlined for fiscal analysis, we
could try to evaluate solvency, including the external constraint, by ana-
lyzing the relationship between the future external debt-service paths
and some indicator of future capacity to generate foreign exchange, such
as current account balances or expected growth of exports. Again, how-
ever, it has proved difficult to translate this into operational indicators.
One interesting example is provided by Cohen (1985), who defined a
solvency index that measures the fraction of exports that should be de-
voted to repaying the debt in order to satisfy the solvency constraint. In
follow-up work, Cohen (1996) estimated that, for African countries, a
debt-to-export ratio of about 210 percent should be the threshold at
which a country’s debt should be rescheduled. Because this index is based
on trade flows only, leaving aside capital movements, it needs to be used
with caution. In a situation of massive capital flight, it should be used to-
gether with an evaluation of the capital outflows and their possibility of
being repatriated while causing liquidity problems.
Concessionality and the Present Value of Debt
The concept of the present value of debt introduced in the solvency ap-
proach is especially important for LICs. To the extent that debt is highly
concessional, nominal debt may not be a good indicator of debt burden
because nominal debt stock will not reflect adequately the present value
of the future debt-servicing burden. For countries with highly concession-
al debt, therefore, it is particularly appropriate to use the present value of
debt—that is, the discounted value of all future debt-service payments—
as a measure of the future debt burden. What would change in our analy-
sis of the fiscal and external approaches to debt sustainability if we were
to use the present value of debt instead of its nominal value? One way to
move from a nominal to a present value approach is to use the grant ele-
ment (GE) concept, as shown in equation (2.7), which is defined as the
difference between the nominal stock of debt and its present value, ex-
pressed as a percentage of the nominal debt stock. Note also that the val-
ue of the GE depends on the discount rate used (that is, a reduction of
the discount rate reduces the GE of debt by increasing the present value
of the debt).
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GEt = 
(Dt – PVt ) ⇔ Dt =     
PVt (2.7)
Dt (1 – GEt)
.
To look at the dynamics of the GE, define mt as the change in GE over
time, with (1 – GEt)/(1 – GEt –1) = 1 – mt. The parameter m is thus equal
to zero if the GE of the overall debt stock remains unchanged between
two periods, and the parameter is positive (negative) if the GE increases
(falls). Using this definition, it can be shown that the change in the ratio
of the present value of debt to GDP over time, which is denoted as Dpv, is
equal to
Dpv = rt
f’ – g’t – mt(1 + rt
f’)
pvt–1
f’ – (1 GEt)(nica**t ).(1 + gt’)
(2.8)
There are two main differences between equations (2.5) and (2.8).The
first difference is that a higher degree of concessionality (a larger value for
GE) relaxes the constraint imposed by the adjusted noninterest current
account balance. The second difference is that, if the degree of conces-
sionality increases over time, the required growth rate, necessary to en-
sure that the debt ratio does not increase, is reduced. Simply stated, a
higher degree of concessionality over time reduces the required ability to
finance future interest payments through growth. Conversely, for coun-
tries whose borrowing becomes less concessional over time (for example,
because a country reaches middle-income status and graduates from the
International Development Association [IDA]), the required growth rate
to ensure sustainability will increase with the drop in concessionality of
the loans received.
Equation (2.9) provides the law of motion of the present value debt-
to-GDP ratio under the fiscal accounting approach, starting from equa-
tion (2.3), which already factored changes in the exchange rate. There is
one variable in equation (2.9) that needs to be defined: agb is the net bud-
getized grant aid as a ratio of GDP (and b** is the primary balance with-
out grants) to single out the effect of (budgetized) grant aid on the dy-
namics.
Dpv = r*t – gt + eta
f (1 + rt
f)(1–mt) – (1 + r*t )mt  (2.9)(1 + gt)
Dpv = pvt –1 – (1 – GEt)(b**t + agb,t).
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As before, a large depreciation that raises the domestic currency value
of foreign currency debt can lead to a sharp rise in the debt ratio, even if
revenue growth exceeds the interest rate, and the primary balance after
grants is in surplus. Thus, substantial changes in the present value debt-
to-exports ratio can occur in only a few years, even with a prudent and
highly concessional borrowing policy and low fiscal deficits.8 In addition,
as was the case with external sustainability, equation (2.9) shows that, in
the fiscal approach, changes toward higher concessionality over time will
decrease the burden placed on growth to be able to repay loans, and re-
duce the impact of variations in the exchange rate because grants do not
have to be repaid. In addition, a higher level of grant aid will reduce the
financing gap.
It is also worth noting that the external or fiscal financing gap—that is,
the second term on the right-hand side of equations (2.8) and (2.9)—is
the factor that most directly captures the tension between debt sustain-
ability and the need for financing. A fiscal gap is equivalent to the adjust-
ed primary deficit after grants, whereas an external gap is defined as the
adjusted noninterest current account deficit. When a country or govern-
ment boosts its investment to achieve higher growth and eventually
greater poverty reduction, the financing gap rises, as reflected in a larger
current account and/or fiscal deficit, unless there is an offsetting fall in
domestic public or private consumption. In the absence of higher grants
or other nondebt financing, such as debt rescheduling or the buildup of
arrears, debt ratios would increase.
In the applied chapters on Paraguay, Guinea, Rwanda, and Senegal in
this volume, case studies that rely on the above-mentioned concepts or
adaptations of them are provided to reveal the sustainability of various
growth and taxation-spending scenarios over time. The debt module of
SimSIP (which stands for Simulations for Social Indicators and Poverty)
is a simple tool used to perform complex simulations easily. Analysts can
use such tools to help governments and other actors identify some simple
trade-offs between debt sustainability and key macroeconomic variables
involved in the debt dynamics, such as growth, interest rates, inflation
rates, and exchange rate changes, as well as fiscal and current account
deficits and their impact on antipoverty spending.
In the rest of this chapter, we consider the operational aspects of debt
sustainability analysis, including alternative frameworks that have been
proposed to look at the issue and the latest initiatives (such as the HIPC
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Initiative and the MDRI) taken by donors to reduce the burden of debt
service for poor countries.
Operationalizing Debt Sustainability Concepts:
The HIPC Initiative
How can the different concepts and indicators of debt sustainability be
put together in an operational framework to guide monitoring and deci-
sion making on real-world country cases? 
Four Steps Necessary to Conduct a DSA
This section sketches four basic steps required to conduct a DSA, and
then briefly discusses the HIPC framework adopted by the IMF and the
World Bank. The four steps actually draw on what already is operational
at the IMF and the World Bank (IMF 2002; IMF and IDA 2005). The
steps are as follows:
1. Deciding on the appropriate debt sustainability concepts and indicators.
2. Conducting consistent analysis of the debt dynamics based on the
chosen menu of indicators, under a most-likely benchmark scenario,
over a medium-to-long-term period.
3. Running stress tests using a number of detailed alternative scenarios,
taking into account the most relevant structural vulnerabilities of the
economy.
4. Translating debt sustainability into borrowing policies.
The first step involves measuring the selected indicators. One require-
ment for this step is an up-to-date and complete database of the country’s
debt. This might demand that a lot of technical assistance be given to a
debtor country’s debt management offices by the Commonwealth units,
the IMF, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the
World Bank, and the bilateral donor-funded HIPC Capacity Building Pro-
gram.9 This step also requires country-specific analysis. First, the analysis
should lead to a decision on the coverage of debt—that is, whether it is
useful to include domestic debt in the coverage of public debt and private
debt in the coverage of external debt. Furthermore, it should be decided
whether to prioritize the use of nominal debt stocks in the analysis or to
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focus more on the present value of debt. Next, one should consider
whether to put the focus on debt stock ratios or on debt-service analysis:
is it debt overhang or the crowding-out of current resources that is the
key constraint? Finally, one should decide whether to focus more on ex-
ternal or on fiscal sustainability—that is, whether a country basically is
constrained more by foreign exchange issues or by recurrent fiscal gaps,
and thereby choose the most appropriate debt indicator denominators
(exports, GDP, or government revenues).10
In the second step, when the key constraints are identified and appro-
priate indicators are chosen, DSA applies the basic dynamics formulas,
such as those derived before, to the current values of the indicators to de-
rive their medium-to-long-term evolution. Again, this should be done on
the foundation of most-likely base values for the key macroeconomic
variables involved in the dynamics. For this, the IMF and the World Bank
have designed templates—one for fiscal and one for external debt analy-
sis—that can be adjusted to fit a specific country situation. The templates
look at the role of endogenous dynamics, as well as the role of primary fis-
cal and noninterest current account balances. For LICs, it is important
that the dynamics explicitly take into account the importance of bud-
getized grants and other non-debt-creating flows, as well as the use of “ex-
ceptional financing.”11
Next to highlighting the evolution under a baseline scenario, it is cru-
cial to perform the stress tests described in step three to determine the
impact of possible shocks and alternative outputs of key macroeconomic
variables. Scenarios can be based on historic volatilities or can take into
account changed structures and likely new near-future threats (such as
the impact of HIV/AIDS) or opportunities as well as needs (such as those
related to the MDGs and the increased focus on poverty reduction). Fol-
lowing the discussion of the human development approach to debt sus-
tainability, a case could be made routinely to include in those stress tests
one scenario involving the projected amount of spending needed to meet
the MDGs or other similar objectives put forward in the country’s pover-
ty reduction strategy.
The final step produces borrowing policies. The overall picture of the
medium-term evolution of key debt indicators should feed into policy
prescriptions regarding future borrowing. For LICs, this typically refers to
a minimal grant element required in future borrowing. Here again a la-
tent conflict often is detected between requirements to meet debt sus-
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tainability in a conventional way and borrowing policies linked to meet-
ing poverty reduction and MDG needs. It also is important to note that
DSA often has been performed jointly by the IMF and the World Bank
on the basis of country input. Now, however, it is growing more common
for countries (especially within the HIPC Initiative context) to conduct
their own DSAs using the same tools and formulas as the IMF and World
Bank use, largely thanks to capacity-building assistance provided.
Debt Sustainability Concepts Used in the HIPC Initiative 
and the Impact of the Initiative 
The best-known operational debt sustainability framework has been the
one devised to guide debt relief decisions for the HIPC Initiative. Started
in 1996, the initiative explicitly aimed to use the debt relief instruments
to reduce to a sustainable level the participating countries’ debt burden.
The purpose of this section is not to evaluate the initiative in detail for
there is a large body of literature on the topic.12 We give only a brief
overview of the framework used.
The HIPC Initiative sustainability framework focuses on the stock con-
cept for deriving threshold indicators. The present value definition, rather
than nominal stocks, is used to reflect the relative degree of concessionali-
ty of the country’s debt. The particular thresholds use elements of both
the fiscal and external sustainability frameworks. More precisely, there are
two key ratios: (1) a ratio of the net present value of debt to exports that
should remain below 150 percent (external window), and (2) a ratio of
the net present value of debt to government revenue that should remain
below 250 percent. HIPCs can qualify for this fiscal window if their
economies are sufficiently open, as indicated by an exports-to-GDP ratio
of at least 30 percent and a government revenue-to-GDP ratio of at least
15 percent (to reduce moral hazard). These thresholds resulted from a
1999 modification of the original HIPC Initiative into the Enhanced HIPC
Initiative in an attempt to provide broader, deeper, and faster debt relief
(the original HIPC targets were set at 200–250 percent for the ratio of the
net present value of debt to exports, and at 280 percent for the ratio of the
net present value of debt to government revenue). The Enhanced HIPC
Initiative also set targets for indicators related to a debt-service concept,
fixed at 15–20 percent of exports (down from 20–25 percent in the origi-
nal framework), but these are merely indicative targets.
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It is important to note that the HIPC Initiative framework relies on
data concerning external public and publicly guaranteed debt (outstand-
ing and disbursed), including arrears.This means that domestic debt is not
included in the fiscal window.13 Similarly, private external debt is not in-
cluded in the external window.14 A three-year average is used for calcu-
lating exports (of goods and services). Government revenue is central
government revenue, excluding grants. Currency-specific commercial in-
terest reference rates are used as discount rates for calculating the present
value of the debt. The amount of relief is determined on the basis of a
DSA. Note that the debt thresholds used in the Enhanced HIPC Initia-
tive are not to be considered as an elaborated framework of debt sustain-
ability (IMF 2003). The level of the thresholds was set to provide a cush-
ion against external shocks and some safety margin to avoid debt crises.
Recently, the World Bank and the IMF have revised the framework of
the Enhanced HIPC Initiative to better tailor DSA and thresholds to
country circumstances, and they have broadened this into a forward-look-
ing debt sustainability framework for all LICs. Originally, under the En-
hanced HIPC Initiative, the thresholds were set at a uniform level for all
countries. To provide future-oriented guidance on new borrowing and
lending decisions, the new framework adapts the thresholds according to
the performance of the countries as measured through the Country Poli-
cy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA).15 Table 2.1 provides the new in-
dicative thresholds for different levels of policy quality. Furthermore, the
new debt sustainability framework adopted by the Bretton Woods insti-
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Debt sustainability indicator (CPIA ≥ 3.75) (CPIA 3.25–3.75) (CPIA ≤ 3.25)
Present value of debt/GDP 50 40 30
Present value of debt/exports 200 150 100
Present value of debt/revenue 300 250 200
Debt service/exports 25 20 15
Debt service/revenue 35 30 25
Source: IMF and IDA 2005.
Note: CPIA = Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; IDA14 = the 14th replenishment of the IDA’s
resources, agreed in 2005.
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
tutions takes into account debt sustainability indicators for determining
country allocations within the IDA. Previously, debt sustainability did not
enter directly into determining IDA allocation because all IDA credits
were in the form of highly concessional loans. Under IDA13 (the 13th re-
plenishment), however, donors decided that up to a fixed percentage of
IDA allocations could be in the form of grants to reduce future debt bur-
dens. More important, IDA14 country allocations include debt sustain-
ability issues in a direct way by distributing country allocations between
loans and grants, with a higher proportion of grants when debt sustain-
ability is more of a concern (IDA 2005a).
Alternative Approaches to 
Analyzing Debt Sustainability
The policy-making implications of the debt sustainability concepts dis-
cussed so far are quite straightforward: debt-service sustainability often
requires government action and adjustment at the direct government
public budget level (revenue and spending behavior), influencing fiscal
balances and/or actions to enhance a country’s capacity to generate for-
eign exchange and influencing trade balances and current accounts. At
the same time, governments should aim at stimulating economic growth
(important also for endogenous debt dynamics), as well as reducing
poverty. This very well may lead to situations of inherent conflict, where-
by debt service is prioritized and debt sustainability is achieved or main-
tained at the expense of growth and/or poverty reduction. Moreover, it
may lead to situations in which debt itself acts as an obstacle to growth
and poverty alleviation. This difficult trade-off or dilemma has given rise
to a number of alternative definitions of or approaches to debt sustain-
ability—notably the debt overhang approach and the human develop-
ment approach. These alternative approaches are more normative in na-
ture than the preceding ones because they more explicitly hint at some
optimal debt levels that could be targeted.
Debt Overhang
One alternative way to define debt sustainability refers to the presence of
debt overhang, defined as the negative effect of a large debt burden on
economic growth (Krugman 1988). As such, the threshold for debt sus-
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tainability could be defined as the level just before debt starts to have a
negative impact on economic growth. This level might differ from the
debt sustainability thresholds used in traditional fiscal and external ap-
proaches because the absence of debt-servicing problems does not neces-
sarily mean that there is no negative effect of debt on growth.
Debt overhang occurs when an excessive debt stock introduces nega-
tive externalities in the economy beyond the transfer of resources, first on
investment and adjustment and then on economic growth. This is be-
cause high (current and future) debt transfers lead to anticipation by do-
mestic and foreign investors of future higher taxes and increased uncer-
tainty, both of which create a disincentive effect on the present
investment or adjustment decisions of an indebted country. The concept
of “investment” has to be viewed broadly here. It refers to accumulation
in human capital—through spending on education and health care—as
well as in physical capital, such as machinery and infrastructure. It also
captures many types of policy reforms, including structural reforms and
macroeconomic stabilization, whose long-term benefits may come at the
expense of short-term costs.
There are many potential incentive effects at work in the debt over-
hang approach. First, debt overhang may reduce the willingness of debtor
governments to execute adjustment programs because a possibly large
part of the benefits will go to foreign creditors as increased debt-service
transfers and will not stay in the country as increased consumption or ad-
ditional investment capacity. Second, debt overhang may depress private
investment (by both domestic and foreign investors). Indeed, because the
public sector has to service the debt, public spending will have to be re-
duced, internal transfers will have to be operated from the private sector,
or, most likely, both actions will occur. As a consequence, not only public
investment but also private (domestic and foreign) investment will be de-
pressed as expected external transfers are transmitted throughout the
economy in the form of higher uncertainty and large expected taxes of
different kinds.These effects reduce perceived future net after-tax returns
on investment and increase the risk premium on investment. Additional-
ly, the public sector may be tempted to use taxes on financial intermedia-
tion, such as the inflation tax.This negative incentive effect can be partic-
ularly pronounced in the sectors most likely to be tapped for public
financing, be it the monetary and financial systems, the manufacturing
sector, or trade activities.
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Apart from the investment disincentive effect, debt overhang also will
scare off potential new foreign lenders. In the absence of seniority, new
loans enter the same pool as old loans and instantly metamorphose into
as poor a financial claim as the old loans. Furthermore, as long as the old
claims stand undiminished, the new lenders will have to share the fruits
of any improved creditworthiness with the old lenders.This depresses the
return to the potential new lenders, and keeps them from doing business
with the debtor countries. As a consequence, these countries are shunned
in international credit markets and cannot borrow as they otherwise
could. Some high-yielding investments, which investors would undertake
notwithstanding the disincentive effect described earlier, may thus go un-
exploited because of a lack of financing (Diwan and Rodrik 1992).
Through those various channels, debt overhang therefore acts as a
brake on economic growth, beyond siphoning off public resources for
debt service. This line of reasoning then generally is turned into an argu-
ment in favor of debt relief because it can be claimed that debt reduction
has a more beneficial effect than an equivalent amount of aid injected in
a debt-ridden economy.The difference resides in the stimulating effect on
the private sector stemming from debt relief, made possible by the 
reduced foreign claim on future gains. By selecting debt relief, the donor
ensures that the proceeds of economic growth remain within the econo-
my. Political features also are important: debt relief increases domestic ac-
ceptance of austerity because the burden of reforms is perceived to be
shared with creditors.
The debt overhang hypothesis also gives rise to the concept of a debt
Laffer curve (Krugman 1988), suggesting that expected payments to
creditors might even start to decrease with higher debt at high debt ratios
because of this debt overhang effect. Again this can be turned into an ar-
gument in favor of debt relief. For countries with high levels of debt, it
might be in creditors’ self-interest to grant some debt relief because it
would lead to higher expected payments. Empirical studies, predomi-
nantly using information from the secondary market of value-impaired
debt (such as Claessens 1990; Cohen 1991) do seem to validate the exis-
tence of the debt Laffer curve and the position of some countries at the
“wrong side” of the curve, where creditors collectively benefit from grant-
ing debt relief.Yet the available evidence in this area must be treated with
caution. The apparent disincentive effect of a large debt on investment,
and hence on growth, may reflect instead the fact that low investment re-
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sults from the general dismal state of the economy in some countries
where a large debt overhang is just another reflection of the conditions.
Results from most early studies using a linear relationship between debt
and growth show that the strength of the association between debt and
growth varies substantially according to the selection of the debt indica-
tor and the model specification. Upon suggestion that this relationship
between debt and growth might follow a nonlinear inverted U—that is,
following the Laffer curve argument—nonlinear specifications are better.
The more recent studies do seem to point to a higher effect of debt on
growth. But the magnitude of the effect varies substantially across speci-
fications, and it presents large cross-country variation. Patillo, Poirson, and
Ricci (2002) showed that the average effect of external debt on growth is
negative when the debt stock exceeds 160–170 percent of exports or
35–40 percent of GDP; they also found that the marginal effect of exter-
nal debt on growth is negative in a very wide range of 30–115 percent of
exports for nominal debt (or 30–295 percent of exports with debt ex-
pressed in present value), or between 5 percent and 90 percent for the
nominal stock-to-GDP ratio (and between 5 percent and 50 percent for
present value of the debt-to-GDP ratio). Patillo, Poirson, and Ricci (2004)
showed that this debt overhang effect is stronger in countries with poli-
cies and institutions of weak quality, and with lower aid flows. In a way
that is similar to the World Bank and IMF framework that will be dis-
cussed below, this would call for a country-specific determination of debt
sustainability thresholds. Finally, Clements, Bhattacharya, and Nguyen
(2004) showed that a substantial reduction in the debt stock for HIPCs is
associated with an annual increase of approximately 1.0 percent in per
capita income, and that it could accelerate growth indirectly by about 0.5
percent a year in some HIPCs if a substantial percentage of the debt re-
lief were directly channeled into public investment. The study also hint-
ed that this effect will be largely realized when envisaged HIPC debt re-
lief is executed.
Debt Sustainability from a Human Development Perspective
A more radical alternative approach is often referred to as the human de-
velopment approach to debt sustainability and debt relief. This approach
prioritizes the MDGs instead of conventional debt sustainability, and it
states that even if a country has the resources to pay its contractual debt
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service, current debt service might crowd out public spending of resources
needed to reach substantial poverty reduction or the achievement of the
other MDGs. As such, debt sustainability is defined as that level where
debt service no longer crowds out MDG-priority public spending. This in-
troduces a concept of “affordable” debt service linked to the MDGs, and
the notion is translated into an argument in favor of debt relief—prefer-
ably in terms of debt-service relief. Clearly, reducing debt service can ben-
efit the recurrent expenditure budget directly. In most LICs, if we postu-
late the existence of a recurrent-fiscal gap, applying this alternative debt
sustainability concept might be very effective in relaxing this gap.
In practice, the approach can be operationalized in many different
ways. The crowding-out effect on priority spending by debt service could
be minimized by establishing upper limits on debt-service ratios (debt
service related to government revenue or GDP). One prominent propos-
al along these lines was suggested by Birdsall and Williamson (2002). An-
other was pioneered in a Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
(CAFOD) article by Northover, Joyner, and Woodward (1998), and ex-
tended by Berlage et al. (2003). We describe below the basic algebra of
this approach.
The CAFOD proposal works in the following way. Define for each
country the tax-revenue base as Y – A, where Y is GDP and A is nontax-
able income. The proposal suggests taking as A all incomes below the
poverty line of $1 a day per person, and then defining the standard rev-
enue as equal to a (Y – A). This is obtained by applying to Y a standard-
tax rate a. The “net feasible revenue” is then the standard revenue minus
B, where B is an allowance for basic human needs. Net feasible revenue
measures the government resources available to meet other public expen-
ditures, including debt service. When the net feasible revenue is negative,
any amount of debt is “unsustainable” and should be cancelled outright.
When the net feasible revenue is positive, sustainable debt service is de-
fined as an acceptable proportion b of net feasible revenue to be devoted
to debt service.Therefore, the sustainable debt service is equal to (b.a) (Y –
A) – bB. This can be rewritten as c(Y – C), with c = b.a, C* = b.a.A + b.B,
and C = C*/c. This estimation may result in a negative figure if the al-
lowance for basic needs exceeds standard revenue. Hence, the final for-
mula is a definition of sustainable debt service (SDS) as a suitable frac-
tion c of an adjusted national income Y – C whenever the latter is
positive. That is,
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SDS = c.max [0, Y – C]. (2.10)
Instead of computing this on an annual basis, Berlage et al. (2003)
turned this into a 15-year scheme (until 2015) to make sure that debt is
fully extinguished after 2015 and that it stays sustainable throughout the
period by including an insurance scheme. For this, the authors first com-
puted net feasible revenue. If negative, the country’s debt is cancelled
outright. If positive, one must calculate SDS according to equation (2.7)
and go to the next step. That next step consists of multiplying the calcu-
lated SDS by 15 to obtain the net present value of debt that will be amor-
tized in 15 years by that SDS (using a real discount rate equal to the rate
of growth of real GDP). One then compares the result with the country’s
net present value of outstanding debt (call it NPV), and retains the lower
of the two figures, which can be denoted by NPV*. The corresponding
debt service, SDS*, is equal to NPV* divided by 15.
The final step consists of comparing SDS* with SDS. If SDS* = SDS as
given by equation (2.6), then by construction it is equal to c(Y – C). The
country benefits from a debt reduction equal to the difference between
NPV and NPV*. For each of the next 15 years (each year being t), the
country will transfer into a trust fund (called PAIR) an amount equal to
SDS*t = c.max [0, Yt – Ct]. At the end of the 15 years, no further service
will be required on the initially outstanding debt. That debt will be ex-
tinct. If SDS* < SDS, the country does not benefit from a debt reduction
because its outstanding debt is sustainable. However, it is still desirable to
let the country benefit from the embedded insurance mechanism. If we
define d = NPV*/NPV (=SDS*/SDS), with d<1, the country’s annual
service then will be SDS*t = d.c.max [0, Yt – Ct]. Again, no further service
will be required after the year 2015.
Thus, the basic conceptual setup by Northover, Joyner, and Woodward
(1998) is to determine the resources needed for the country to attain the
MDGs first, and then attempt to achieve them with the resources gener-
ated by the public sector in the government budget (on the basis of an
objective minimal “tax rate” on GDP, to avoid moral hazard). The afford-
able debt service is determined on the basis of the resources left after
spending everything needed to achieve the MDGs and other priority
spending (rather than de facto prioritizing debt service).
It is clear that applying this kind of approach in practice would be
fraught with difficulties, including problems of moral hazard. Putting for-
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ward such an alternative approach, however, has influenced actual debt
relief practices in a more indirect way. Applying this approach has shown
that, for a number of countries (although not for all of them), no re-
sources would be left for debt service. Related to these proposals are calls
for a more “independent” determination of debt sustainability or “insol-
vency.”16 Finally, the more ethical approach to debt sustainability uses the
concept of odious debt, again to advocate for full debt repudiation (Bird-
sall and Williamson 2002, appendix C; Kremer and Jayachandran 2002).
Several of these approaches and concepts have been used by advocates,
especially within the nongovernmental organization community, to call
for full debt cancellation across the board. It can be argued that these ap-
proaches have contributed to the international community recently hav-
ing granted additional debt relief through the MDRI.
An Explicit MDG Perspective in the MDRI
One requirement of the HIPC Initiative is for participating countries to
increase their poverty-reducing expenditure after receiving the debt re-
lief. This means that some countries may struggle to meet poverty reduc-
tion and MDG goals while maintaining debt sustainability (Fedelino and
Kudina 2003). This has been documented by country-case research. Ed-
wards provided an interesting example by introducing a model that ex-
plicitly considers the role of domestic debt and computes the fiscal policy
path that is compatible with aggregate fiscal sustainability (2002b) and
with external sustainability (2002a) in the post-HIPC era. Applying the
model to the case of Nicaragua illustrates the challenges in the post-HIPC
period. Under a reasonable set of assumptions regarding future GDP
growth, concessional loans, and donations, the required fiscal adjustment
appears to be severe and threatens to jeopardize implementation of the
country’s poverty reduction strategy. Such case studies and, more gener-
ally, some countries’ continued difficulty in remaining on a sustainable
debt path even after implementing the HIPC Initiative have reinforced
the call for a broadened framework. It was this call that became the basis
for the additional debt relief granted in the MDRI.
At its Gleneagles Summit in July 2005, the G-8 called on the African
Development Bank, the IMF, and the World Bank to provide additional
debt relief by cancelling all the remaining debt owed to those three insti-
tutions by a sample of LICs—more precisely, owed by those countries
that have or will soon have achieved the completion point under the
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HIPC Initiative. Later, this proposal became officially referred to as the
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Since then, the governing boards of
these institutions have responded positively to the proposal, and imple-
mentation has started.17
This additional debt relief is limited to post–completion point HIPC
Initiative countries,18 and its purpose was not to allow countries to regain
debt sustainability in a conventional sense because, in principle, HIPC
debt relief already had achieved this. As such, at least in theory, MDRI
debt cancellation refers explicitly to a human development type of debt
sustainability concept, linking the debt relief explicitly to the need to pro-
vide additional resources to selected LICs to meet the MDGs. The entry
conditions for the recipient countries refer to (1) broad macroeconomic
stability, (2) overall commitment by the recipient government to imple-
ment a poverty alleviation strategy in the framework of the PRSP initia-
tive, and (3) a minimal quality of public expenditure management in the
recipient country. These requirements should facilitate the use of the 
resources freed by this additional debt cancellation for expenditures that
actually further the MDGs or similar objectives put forward in the coun-
try’s PRSP.
As of the date of writing, all completion point HIPC countries have
been benefiting from the MDRI (as have two non-HIPCs, Cambodia and
Tajikistan, which receive only additional IMF debt relief). This has re-
sulted not only in close to $19 billion19 in additional debt relief in pres-
ent value terms, but also in a considerable reduction in the recipient
country’s debt sustainability indicators. One concern among donors is
that this reduction in debt ratios might trigger a new buildup of debt in
the future, posing additional challenges to the forward-looking debt sus-
tainability framework for LICs in place (see IMF and World Bank 2006).
Conclusion
The analysis of debt sustainability in LICs cannot be based simply on
models that have been developed for industrial countries because a num-
ber of characteristics that are rather specific to LICs must be taken into
account. LICs receive little external private capital flows, whether in debt
or equity form. The relative absence of foreign investment in equity form
limits the use of non-debt-creating external flows (other than grants) to
finance foreign exchange gaps. By contrast, LICs sometimes receive sub-
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stantial amounts of official grants that reduce the foreign exchange gap
and supplement domestically generated government revenues, and there-
by relax the fiscal gap and, potentially, the recurrent-fiscal gap. This is
more the case when grants are in the form of budget support and when
fungibility of spending is not hampered by earmarked aid flows. On the
other hand, given its relative importance in the government budget, aid
uncertainty and volatility may complicate debt sustainability analysis.
LICs also receive sometimes highly concessional official financing apart
from grants. This makes it more likely that the return on investment does
exceed its cost, and the debt dynamic is sustainable. It also introduces a
potentially large difference between the nominal debt stock (book value)
and the present value of future debt service, and it increases the appeal of
looking at debt sustainability indicators based on present value concepts
of debt. Some LICs often rely on substantial amounts of exceptional fi-
nancing to cover both fiscal and foreign exchange gaps. Exceptional 
financing refers here particularly to the use of arrears on (external) debt,
debt rescheduling, and/or debt forgiveness (possibly including noncon-
cessional IMF lending).20 Also, government’s use of domestic debt to fi-
nance fiscal gaps generally is limited in LICs, even if domestic debt mar-
kets are developing rapidly in some countries. Moreover, private sector
external debt generally is limited. Given all these factors, LICs typically
experience a large vulnerability to external shocks of all kinds. Therefore,
it is important to look for mechanisms that may link debt service more
explicitly to the capacity to pay.
Taking into account the context of LICs, the objectives of this chapter
have been to present a number of basic concepts related to debt sustain-
ability, to highlight their dynamic nature, and to explain how the con-
cepts and related indicators can inform public policy in LICs. To judge
whether a given debt evolution hampers debt sustainability, we must de-
termine indicative threshold values for the relevant variables. It must be
emphasized, however, that many factors influencing debt sustainability
are not easily brought together in a few thresholds. Over time, a large
body of literature has emerged that tries to look at what indicators are
most relevant and what indicators are likely threshold values. Studies
have tried to identify the probability of debt unsustainability on the basis
of (ex post) analysis that discriminates between problem and no-problem
countries, distinguishing those countries that have experienced debt serv-
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icing problems from those that have not, regardless of the measures that
were used.
The empirical studies using these frameworks rely on limited depend-
ent variable models, such as discriminant analysis or logit and probit
analysis; or on more sophisticated methods, such as binary recursive trees
(as in Manasse and Roubini 2005).When judged against the target of pro-
viding unified, absolute thresholds, the success of these models to date has
been fairly modest. Results typically are being used as guiding values
rather than as absolute threshold values, especially when determining debt
sustainability on the basis of one or a few indicators only. This conclusion
was reaffirmed by recent analysis (Kraay and Nehru 2006). The authors
started from a novel way of defining a problem situation of debt sustain-
ability, labeled “debt distress,” and configured it as a situation in which a
country resorts to exceptional finance in any of three forms: (1) building
significant arrears on external debt; (2) rescheduling the debt, notably in
the Paris Club; and (3) using nonconcessional IMF lending. Using probit
analysis, they showed that cross-country and time variations in the inci-
dence of debt distress are explained not only by debt burden indicators
but also by differences in the quality of institutions and policy (for exam-
ple, as measured by the World Bank’s CPIA Index), and by vulnerability
to external shocks. IMF analysis basically has confirmed those results,
which have directly fed into the new forward-looking debt sustainability
framework of the IMF and the World Bank (IMF and IDA 2005; IMF and
World Bank 2006). Indicative threshold values, however, have been and
will continue to be used in operational work.
In the future, the probability of debt problems likely will remain high
in many LICs, and is likely to increase sharply if large-scale finance re-
quired to meet the MDGs is provided, even at historic levels of conces-
sionality (Kraay and Nehru 2006). Therefore, a richer framework of debt
sustainability is called for, one in which the use of simple debt burden in-
dicators is extended by adding indicators for quality of policies and shocks
and by taking into account the needs of poor countries. The existence of
difficult trade-offs also suggests that the targeted level of sustainable debt
should vary (positively) with the quality of its policies and institutions,
and (negatively) with the vulnerability to shocks that the country experi-
ences: country-specific debt thresholds reflecting both policies and
shocks are simply more appropriate.
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Beyond the issue of the choice of indicators for DSA, what ultimately
matters for policy is trying to assess how much “fiscal space” a country has
to pay for public spending and what its sources of financing could be
without compromising the country’s solvency in the long run. The con-
cept of fiscal space, which is broader than that of debt sustainability,
refers to a government’s ability to undertake spending without impairing
its solvency—that is, without compromising its present and future ability
to service its debt (Heller 2005). In recent years, this concept has
emerged as an important subject for debate in the international commu-
nity. It was used initially to advocate for traditional fiscal deficit targets
not limiting the ability of a government to finance growth-enhancing
projects. More broadly, it refers to any constraints to particular public ex-
penditures that could lead to higher growth and better achievements of
poverty reduction and social goals, such as the MDGs. Fiscal space can be
created by improving the effectiveness of public expenditure, increasing
fiscal revenues, mobilizing grant aid, and/or issuing new internal or exter-
nal debt. A country thus can create fiscal space within or outside its exist-
ing borrowing parameters.
Several policy packages that would not jeopardize solvency can be pic-
tured, but the choice of specific policies cannot be determined without
considering country circumstances. Improving the effectiveness of public
expenditures can liberate public resources for allocation to priority sec-
tors, but also should enhance growth and contribute to improving the
country’s solvency. Similarly, increasing fiscal revenues can create fiscal
space and have a positive impact on growth and solvency when addition-
al revenues result mainly from enlarging the tax base, applying new
nondistortionary taxes, harmonizing tax rates and tax systems, and im-
proving tax compliance. Grants also can contribute to creating fiscal
space in a productive manner, but the funds should be used to finance
pro-growth expenditures that are consistent with the rest of the budget
and that take into account multisectoral synergies. Finally, some countries
may choose to generate fiscal space by increasing the use of their internal
or external borrowing capacity. The ultimate result will depend on how
the additional resources affect the solvency equation through the ex-
change rate, interest rates, and growth channels.
50 Public Finance for Poverty Reduction
(c) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank
Notes
1. A fiscal gap is a special subcategory of the savings gap. Its existence assumes
that it is impossible to transfer the private savings slack into budgetary re-
sources either by increased taxation or by the inflation tax. Otherwise, there
can be only one overall savings gap.
2. As the abstract of Ley’s article nicely states, there is “nothing new here—just a
concise yet detailed presentation of the simple but inexorable algebra of sus-
tainability.”
3. See Borensztein and Mauro (2004) for an extensive analysis in favor of issu-
ing GDP-linked debt, and the comment to their proposal by Claessens
(Borensztein and Mauro 2004, pp. 208–10) that focuses mainly on practical
difficulties. Other recent proposals focus on the establishment of a new IMF
facility to provide insurance or contingency financing to protect against these
shocks.
4. There is actually a small body of related literature on the concept of “original
sin”—that is, a situation in which the domestic currency cannot be used to
borrow abroad and sometimes even domestically (see Eichengreen and Haus-
mann 1999). Proposals to allow countries to borrow abroad in domestic cur-
rency are discussed in Hausmann and Rigobon (2003).
5. For some Francophone African countries, one might use the euro instead.
6. For detailed solvency constraint models, see Agénor and Montiel (1996).
7. Although many economists view “net worth” as the right fiscal concept to fo-
cus on, most of them agree that it is difficult to measure. Easterly (1999) has
tested empirically the implications of a fiscal model introducing the net worth
concept, but has not provided an operational estimate of this variable, given
existing difficulties.
8. A notable example is the situation that exists in Uganda. For more informa-
tion, see IMF (2003, p. 26).
9. For an early review of the program, see IDA and IMF (2002).
10. Simple indicators, such as the exports-to-GDP ratio (c) or the government
revenues-to-GDP ratio (r), can help a lot in determining the key constraints:
low values (relative to group averages) on these simple indicators already de-
tect a key vulnerability. For an application in Bolivia, see IMF (2003, p. 23).
11. The templates together with country applications can be found at the World
Bank’s Web site (http://www.worldbank.org). For a manual describing how to
perform a DSA for LICs, see World Bank (2006b). For a detailed analysis of
fiscal debt sustainability using this framework for a stylized typical LIC with a
high debt, see Baldacci and Fletcher (2004).
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12. For detailed reviews, see Birdsall and Williamson (2002), Gunter (2002),
World Bank (2003, 2006a), Sun (2004), UNCTAD (2004), Chauvin and
Kraay (2005, 2006), and IDA and IMF (2006).
13. Exclusion of domestic debt is consistent with the treatment by the Paris Club,
and it is explained by the difficulties involved in including in the analysis the
HIPCs’ rather narrow internal financial markets.
14. Hjertholm (2003) has shown that the thresholds used for the two windows
are not analytically comparable.
15. Beginning in 2005, the CPIA is fully disclosed, and it has been renamed the
IDA Resource Allocation Index.
16. These proposals generally are known as referring to a “fair and transparent 
arbitration procedure.” For an early proposal along these lines, based on the
internationalization of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, see Raffer (1990); for a
more recent proposal, see Sachs (2002).
17. For details, see African Development Bank Group (2006), IMF (2006), and
IDA (2005b), respectively. See especially IDA and IMF (2006) for an overview
of the current status of implementation. Recently, the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank also decided to join the MDRI and grant additional debt relief to
its post-HIPCs.
18. An exception to this limitation is IMF debt relief for which LICs with a per
capita annual income of less than $380 also qualify (IMF 2006).
19. A billion is 1,000 millions.
20. The extensive use of exceptional financing itself can be used as an indicator
to identify unsustainable debt. Kraay and Nehru (2006) denoted this as “debt
distress” and used the concept to derive sustainable debt thresholds.
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